Lake Chad Basin Violence Rises as ISWAP and Boko Haram Rebuild Strength

Abuja, Nigeria – United States and Nigerian forces killed Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, the second-in-command of ISIL (ISIS), in what officials have hailed as a counterterrorism win. For specialists watching the Lake Chad Basin, the operation instead throws into relief how entrenched and layered the region’s insecurity remains.

Al-Minuki, a Nigerian from Borno State, ran operations from a compound near Lake Chad, at the heart of one of the globe’s busiest theatres for armed groups. His use of northeastern Nigeria as a base points to the same pressures fuelling a fresh wave of attacks by the ISIL offshoot Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and its competitor Jama’at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da’wa wa al-Jihad (JAS), commonly called Boko Haram.

Boko Haram’s quieter comeback may be just as telling. While security services trained much of their effort on the stronger ISWAP, JAS appears to have used the lull to reorganise.

“While regional forces focused on countering ISWAP’s threats, partly due to the group’s advanced drone capabilities, Boko Haram appears to have taken advantage of the relative attention on its rival to regroup,” Nimi Princewill, a security expert in the Sahel, told Al Jazeera. “This, in turn, seems to have enabled both factions to rebuild strength and carry out further attacks in the area.”

Porous borders, weak state capacity, and rising attacks

Beyond the tactical chess between Boko Haram and ISWAP, the renewed bloodshed around Lake Chad also exposes wider failures in how affected governments share intelligence and align policy.

“Although Mali and Nigeria do not share a common border, the large expanse of the Sahel that straddles them has several porous borders that allow the movement of jihadi elements and their weapons. The situation in Mali has made the Sahel a more permissive environment for armed groups, amplifying risks for Nigeria through spillover dynamics,” Kabir Amadu, managing director of Beacon Security and Intelligence Limited in Nigeria, told Al Jazeera.

At the same time, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger have struggled to mesh their military campaigns. Logistical delays, separate chains of command, and unequal funding often leave holes along open frontiers that militants can slip through.

Ordinary residents bear the twin weight of violence and aid shortfalls. Many depend on informal ties for safety and daily needs, arrangements that can unintentionally hide fighters or ease their movement.

Humanitarian bodies say more civilians are trapped in loops of flight and forced enlistment, while regional security talks rarely move past one-off military sweeps toward lasting prevention. In several districts, fear, suspicion, and the erosion of traditional leadership may leave people easier targets for pressure from armed factions—conditions both Boko Haram and ISWAP can turn to their advantage.

Money and territory behind the fight

Economics also weigh heavily in the comeback of both movements. Holding Lake Chad’s islands can mean sway over tax routes, contraband paths, and natural resources, making those waters prized ground for rivalry that stretches past religious ideology.

That blend of gun battles and criminal trade likely helps the groups pay their way. Boko Haram’s mix of faith-based messaging and crimes such as robbery and abduction may bankroll operations and draw in restless young people. Enlistment often tracks poverty and joblessness more than doctrine alone.

Weak reintegration schemes add to the cycle. Former fighters who see few options after leaving armed life have returned to Boko Haram. Research by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) found ex-ISWAP members—who risk execution for desertion—crossing into Boko Haram’s Ghazwah wing in Borno, known for robbery and ransom work.

The factions also lean on thin state presence. Remote villages often see patchy policing, scarce public services, and little oversight, leaving room to act with limited pushback.

“ISWAP and Boko Haram have become active again in the Lake Chad Basin for three main reasons: their resilience and ability to adapt to the evolving tactics of the Nigerian armed forces; the lucrative economy of violence that sustains their funding and manpower; and the Nigerian state’s limited ability to establish a legitimate, lasting presence in the region that could undermine their credibility,” Chris Ogunmodede, a Nigerian political analyst, told Al Jazeera.

Limits of force alone

Many drivers of attacks in the Lake Chad Basin will not yield to raids and patrols by themselves. Recruitment pools, supply lines, and pockets of community backing for ISWAP and Boko Haram tie back to long-running poverty, uprooting, weak administration, and political marginalisation.

Figures from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) put 2.9 million internally displaced people in the region, 2.3 million of them in Nigeria. Conflict has shut 1,827 schools across the basin, and donors have met only 19 percent of the humanitarian funding needed for 2025.

“ISWAP and Boko Haram’s recent resurgence reflects not simply a military setback, but a deepening governance vacuum across the Lake Chad Basin,” Abiola Sadiq, a security consultant, told Al Jazeera.

Displaced families, shuttered classrooms, and aid gaps still overlap in the basin. Militants widen their reach through geographic and administrative blind spots, even as joint security efforts lag behind the groups’ shifting methods.

“While the reported killing of ISIL leader Abu-Bilal al-Minuki may temporarily disrupt command structures, it is also likely to trigger retaliatory violence as rival jihadist factions compete for relevance, legitimacy, and territorial influence,” said Sadiq.

In the weeks after the strike, intelligence channels logged a jump in low-level strikes and cross-border incursions, suggesting splintered leadership has not broken the factions’ ability to plan assaults together. Civilians still face curbed travel and higher odds of forced service, shakedowns, and flight from home.

“With Nigeria’s 2027 general elections approaching, these groups are highly likely to intensify their operations, potentially extending attacks beyond their traditional strongholds in the Lake Chad Basin and northeastern Nigeria,” said Sadiq.